BlockLot: Blockchain based Verifiable Lottery by Jo, Yongrae & Park, Chanik
BlockLot: Blockchain-based Verifiable Lottery
Yongrae Jo∗, and Chanik Park †
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Pohang University of Science and Technology
∗memex@postech.ac.kr, †cipark@postech.ac.kr
Abstract—We propose BlockLot, a blockchain based verifi-
able lottery. BlockLot provides transparent, immutable, fair,
and verifiable lottery services enhanced by recent blockchain
technologies such as append-only (replicated) distributed ledger
and smart contract. In addition, BlockLot allows all participants
to perform various verification procedures to ensure that the
system is actually working as expected.
We implement BlockLot services on Hyperledger/Fabric
blockchain platform with web-based user interface.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Lottery, Hyperledger/Fabric
I. INTRODUCTION
LOTTERY events occur frequently. A lottery event re-quires trust between participants and event organizers. In
general, people participate in the event because they believe
the probability of winning lottery is fair. But the trust between
the two is sometimes broken. For example, an event organizer
can manipulate the results of the winner.
To solve the problem of fraudulent lottery, computer soft-
ware can be used to compute winners without human inter-
vention. Lottery program, which is determined solely by input
and output, is believed to be more reliable, fair, transparent
and verifiable than human-involved one.
The existing lottery systems adopt a centralized approach,
in which calculations are performed on a single computer
[1], [2], [14], [15]. However, in such a case, a person who
gains privileged access to the computer (e.g., Hacker), on
which the lottery program is run, may harm its integrity,
transparency, and fairness. For example, an attacker who
gains privileged access can manipulate the winners after the
results are issued. Therefore, the centralized lottery system is
unreliable in nature.
We define three attributes of the unreliable lottery which
includes predictability, modifiability and information hiding.
Predictability means that the random seed used in the lottery
can be predicted. Modifiability means manipulation of event
information, lottery result, random seed, lottery algorithm.
Information hiding represents hiding important details of the
lottery (e.g., changing a prize).
Against the attributes of unreliable lottery system, we
also defined four attributes of reliable lottery which includes
fairness, transparency, immutability, and verifiability. Fairness
means that the winner should not be predictable in advance.
Transparency indicates that the method of drawing winners
and the results of the draw should be transparent to all par-
ticipants. Immutability means that the registered information
can not be modified at ones disposal and no one can change
the result after it is announced. Verifiability represents that the
lottery system should satisfy the aforementioned attributes and
that the results should be verifiable.
We introduce BlockLot, a reliable lottery system based on
blockchain. BlockLot enables reliable lottery in a way of
fair, transparent, immutable, and verifiable. BlockLot uses a
Bitcoin blockchain as a random beacon to choose winners,
which it is unpredictable and publicly verifiable [11], [12].
BlockLot also uses a distributed-replicated ledger based on a
blockchain and all services in BlockLot are supported by smart
contracts in distributed manner. The lottery services provided
by BlockLot includes open, query, subscribe, draw, check, and
verify. The event organizer can open a lottery by providing
required information such as the announcement date, number
of winners, and list of prizes. Participants can query the lottery
events registered and subscribe to the event to participate in it.
When conditions for drawing winners are satisfied, an event
organizer draw winners and participants can check and verify
it.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
design and implementation of BlockLot. Section IV presents
discussion and related work. Section V includes concluding
remarks.
II. BLOCKLOT
A. Overview
We developed BlockLot on Hyperledger/Fabric, a popular
permissioned blockchain platform for enterprise [3]. Hyper-
ledger/Fabric uses peer nodes to maintain a distributed ledger
and execute chaincodes(a.k.a smart contracts). The Web server
and the Hyperledger/Fabric SDK interact with the user (web
client) and the blockchain network. Upon receiving the user’s
transaction, the web server sends it to the peer node and
informs the user of the chaincode execution result. Also, it
fetches the target block number to be used as a random seed
from the Bitcoin random beacon. (Fig. 1)
BlockLot users can be divided into participants and event
organizers. An event organizer can register the lottery event
and draw the winner with authentication (Fig. 2). Participants
can query the event, subscribe to the lottery, and check and
verify the lottery result.
Chaincode is a special program that processes transac-
tions and performs I/O with blockchain database in Hyper-
ledger/Fabric. The types of transaction of BlockLot consists
of query, open, draw, and subscribe, each of which is imple-
mented by chaincode. We used GoLang to write chaincode
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Fig. 1: Overview of BlockLot: Users can use BlockLot ser-
vices through a web server. The peer nodes in the back-end
blockchain network maintain the lottery ledger and execute
transactions of lottery service. Peer uses Bitcoin block hash
for darwing winners.
Fig. 2: Usecase diagram of BlockLot: Event organizer can
open a lottery event and draw winners. Participant can query
events, subscribe to an event, check and verify the result.
because Hyperledger/Fabric supports GoLang as a primary
language.
B. Generating a randomness
C. Lottery sequence
In this section, we introduce the detailed implementation of
the lottery service of BlockLot (Fig. 3).
1) Open: A open transaction registers a lottery in the
blockchain. An event organizer provides event information
such as name, announcement date, number of winners, block
offset. The block offset represents the offset from the most
recent block height in the main chain of the Bitcoin blockchain
at the time of registration(namely target block). We used
developer API provided by [4]. During the process, a unique
ID of the event is generated and inserted into the key/value
store of ledger with related information.
2) Query: A query transaction queries all registered events
in the blockchain. We use the range query function Get-
StateByRange(), which is provided by the chain code shim
interface, to retrieve the strings of (key, value) pairs and
display the concatenated values to the participant.
3) Subscribe: To subscribe to an event, a participant
chooses an event, enters their identity(e.g., email address)
and gets a authentication token. The token is used to prove
that the participant is actually a winner after the drawing.
Subscribe transaction appends a participant to the list of
participants of given event. The hash value of the registration
name concatenated by authentication token is recorded on the
blockchain, ensuring the anonymity of the participant.
4) Draw: A draw transaction can be invoked after the
announcement date has arrived and a target block has been
published. The event organizer enters a pre-issued authentica-
tion token, and if the verification is passed, winners will be
selected. Once the winners are selected, all the information
about the lottery event is fixed, so the information obtained
by using the hash function is used as a verifiable key.(Fig.
4). The winner list and the verifiable key are stored in the
blockchain. The script for draw uses the Fisher-Yates random
shuffle algorithm, which uses the block hash of the target block
as a random seed, to output the winner array in a deterministic
way.
5) Check: After the draw transaction has been completed,
the participant can confirm the winner by entering the name
and authentication token. Like the participant list, the winner
list is also expressed in hash values.
6) Verify: Participants also need to verify the result to
ensure that the lottery is conducted without compromising
the attributes of a reliable lottery. Our assumptions on an
attacker contains a) predicting and manipulating random seed,
b) fabricating event information arbitrarily, c) Manipulating
winner list after draw.(i.e., recording a fraudulent winner list),
d) malicious lottery scripts(e.g., draw winners regardless of
random seed).
a) Preventing an attack on random seed and verifying
its integrity: We use Bitcoin block hash, which is inherently
unpredictable and immutable. Bitcoin miners spread around
the world compete to get reward by solving random-based hash
puzzles, so they generate unpredictable random numbers. Also,
Bitcoin is the largest global blockchain at the moment, which
it is immune to control block hash. Using Bitcoin blockchain
as randomness source is described in [11], [12]. In Bitcoin,
block hash is calculated using its version, previousHash,
merkle root, timestamp, bits, nonce fields of the block. So
we calculate the hash value of the block and compare it with
the one in the lottery in BlockLot.
b) Verifying event information integrity: We also recal-
culate and compare hash values with information determined
at the time of event registration and draw to verify integrity.
Given the participant list, random seed, and draw script,
participant can calculate the winner list and compare it to the
winner list on the blockchain.
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Fig. 3: Lottery sequence: 1) When an event organizer opens a
lottery, participants can query the event, and 2) subscribe to the
event. 3) After the conditions for drawing winners are satisfied,
4) the event organizer draw winners, and the participants can
check and verify the results.
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Fig. 4: Deriving verifiable random key: The key is derived
from concatenating the result from HAMC(initital random key,
random source) and SHA256(Lottery informatino)
c) Verifying response results from multiple peers: A peer
that holds a blockchain can be crashed or hacked, so we need
to query all peers in the network, and compare the response
results. If more than half of the peers return the same response
results, users can accept it.
d) Verifying statistical fairness: The draw script is ver-
ified by z-test to verify that a particular participant does not
win more than a average number of times. Given n times of
running lottery, and when the probability of winning lottery is
p (number of winners / number of participants), its binomial
distribution should follow a normal distribution if n is large
enough. If each participant’s z-score is less than a pre-defined
maximum z-value, the verification is successful, otherwise it
fails.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Chaincode Implementation
Hereby we explain how to handle lottery transactions with
chaincode implementation in Hyperledger/Fabric. Shim pack-
age provides simple interface to access and modify ledger.
For example, GetState() is used to access to the ledger and
PutState() is used to modify it. Unless otherwise stated, all
of the functions below are included in the stub interface.
1) Open: Implementing an open transaction is straight-
forward. It creates a new lottery event struct, fills fields in
the struct, marshals the struct, and inserts it into a ledger
using PutState() with its identifier as a key. Since the ledger
is maintained per channel in Hyperledger/Fabric, ChannelID
should be specified when the event is created. The ID of
open transaction is recorded as well. GetChannel() and
Fig. 5: Lottery event representation in chaincode
GetTxID() is used to do these. DrawTxID and SubscribeTxIDs
are initialized as UNDEFINED. Status field is initialized as
REGISTERED.
2) Query: We used GetStateByRange() to iterate all
registered lottery events in the ledger. By iterating all keys
in the ledger, we can combine those key/value pairs into one
byte array. The byte array is returned to client.
3) Subscribe: A subscribe transaction contains identifiers
of event and member as function arguments. It retrieves an
event using GetState(), checks if the member is already
registered, compares timeliness(i.e., due date). If successful,
it adds the member to MemberList in lottery event. After that,
it also records subscribeTxID returned from GetTxID().
4) Draw: It fetches target block from [4], extracts hash
value from it, and uses it as a random seed for the Fisher-Yates
random shuffle algorithm [13]. We implement the algorithm in
GoLang. The algorithm receives the number of participantsP,
number of winners(W), and random source as arguments.
Since the algorithm requires a fresh random seed in each iter-
ation step to swap two elements in an array with size of P, we
newly design randomOracle() to generate new random values
from the random source(i.e., block hash). randomOracle()
simply hashes the random source and extracts the first four
32-bit integers from the hashed value, and adds them together
to get a single value. Then, the result value is used to choose
two elements randomly in the array. After iterating the array
by P times, the algorithm is terminated. As a result, first W
elements from the array are selected as winners.
Draw also uses two cryptographic hash functions to create
VerifiableRandomKey. The key is derived from HMAC with
random source, initial random key, and SHA256 with lottery
information. (Fig. 4). The initial random key is issued when
the event organizer register a lottery event. Lottery information
includes all fields in lottery event struct (Fig. 5). Since the
winner list is determined, no information in the lottery event
is changed. Therefore, the key for verifying integrity can be
derived from these values.
B. User Interface
Main user interface for BlockLot is implemented in web
browser (Fig. 6). Lotteries are displayed as tables, which con-
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Fig. 6: Main user interface: BlockLot services are available via
web browser based interface. Lotteries are displayd as tables.
Users can use each services by clicking the corresponding
buttons. For example, a user can open a lottery by clicking
the big button with a plus sign at the bottom of the table.
Fig. 7: Open & Subscribe Interface: An event organizer can
open a lottery event by providing its name, number of winners,
announcement date, block offset, and note. Participants partic-
ipate in a lottery event by providing his/her name or e-mail
address.
tain event name, announcement date, number of participants,
number of winners, buttons for subscribe, draw, check, verify,
and info.
An event organizer can register the lottery event by clicking
the big button with a plus sign at the bottom of the table. A
user can participate in a lottery event by clicking the subs.
button and providing his/her name or email address (Fig. 7).
After that, an authentication token will be issued to prove that
the user is a winner when it actually is.
We implemented full-fledged BlockLot and it is publicly
available on [10]. More implementation details as well as user
interfaces that is not covered here can be found on the github
repository.
IV. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
A. Security
a) Anonymity: BlockLot assumes that the participants
identities are known offline in prior, meaning that their privacy
may not be strictly guaranteed. For example, participation
information to an event or the final results can be publicly
available. We believe that this assumption is not a big problem
because many lottery events provided by an enterprise in
real-world often require participant’s identity. (e.g., customers
name).
b) Duplicate participation: Current implementation does
not strictly prevent one user from participating in the same
lottery multiple times. Because the user authentication is done
only by name or e-mail, a malicious user can easily generate
multiple identities to increase the chances of winning lottery.
However, this concern will not be a problem if participant’s
identities are known offline to the event organizer.
c) Lagged blockchain view: We used developer APIs
from [4], a freely available blockchain service provider to read
the latest Bitcoin block. One significant problem here is that
the main server which receives blocks on that site sometimes
see a lagged blockchain view (e.g., temporary network delay).
In that case, an attacker can predict the random seed, and
exploit this information to be winner. But this limitation can
be relaxed by choosing a target block which is much higher
than currently perceived latest block.
B. Deployment environment
BlockLot focuses on lottery in situations where participants’
identities are known in advance. For example, when a company
performs a lottery for promotional purposes, the customer
provides his/her identity to participate in the lottery.
C. Related work
In traditional centralized lottery system, a lottery is executed
in a single computer. But this approach is vulnerable to a single
point of failure as well as to the existence of a hacker who
can gain privileged access to the system. Our work is basically
a decentralized system, which means that a single participant
cannot manipulate any data on the blockchain.
Also, blockchain-based lottery systems such as Kibo [5],
FireLotto [6], Quanta [7], and SmartBilions [8] are based
on Ethereum blockchain [9]. Ethereum provides a turing-
complete smart contract platform which is suitable for exe-
cuting lottery services. In contrast, our system is based on
a permission-based blockchain, mainly for enterprise, which
is orthogonal to Ethereum-based methods because our system
requires identity to be known to participate in a lottery.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present BlockLot, a Blockchain based
verifiable lottery that records all information about the lottery
event in a distributed ledger, and conducts the event in a
transparent and immutable manner. BlockLot uses Bitcoin
block hash as a unpredictable(i.e., fairness) random seed to
draw winners. BlockLot also offers a variety of verification
methods to ensure that the lottery is actually reliable. In
conclusion, BlockLot is expected to significantly reduce social
costs due to fraudulent lotteries.
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